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Abstract 
 
Although college textbooks in Money and Banking discuss the role of deposit insurance and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, they tend to pay only scant attention to these topics.  The 
purpose of this article is to fill this void by providing a primer on deposit insurance, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration which provide 
safety for banks and credit unions and public confidence in our financial system.  In particular, 
the paper discusses the incidence of deposit insurance premiums and the merger policies of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the National Credit Union Administration.  The 
paper is written for a general audience, including college students and the public who are 
interested in contemporary banking issues. 
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Introduction 
 During the 2008-2009 financial crises, 165 banks failed in the United States including 
Washington Mutual Bank, the fifth largest bank in the country.  Another 249 banks failed during 
2010-2011. These failures threatened the stability of the U.S. economy. They also brought into 
the forefront the role that bank supervision and deposit insurance play in preserving the 
wellbeing of our financial system. These services are provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). However, college                                                                                                   
textbooks in Money and Banking and Principles of Macroeconomics tend to pay only scant 
attention to the FDIC and the NCUA.   
 The purpose of our paper is to fill this void by providing a primer on the FDIC and the 
NCUA.  Its intended audience is students in upper level courses in Money and Banking and 
Macroeconomic Principles who want to learn more about the role of the FDIC and NCUA in 
providing safety for banks and credit unions and public confidence in our banking system.  The 
paper is also aimed at the general audience who is interested in our financial system.  Although 
our paper primarily addresses the FDIC, it also discusses the role that the NCUA has in 
preserving the safety of credit unions.  
 The paper begins by describing the historical events that led to the FDIC’s creation.  This 
is followed by a discussion of the nature and operation of the FDIC.  The paper uses the concepts  
of elasticity of supply and demand to discuss the issue of who bears the assessments (premiums)  
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that the FDIC charges on bank deposits.  Finally, the paper considers the FDIC’s role in 
resolving bank failures, including its deposit payoff approach and purchase and assumption 
approach.  Of particular interest is the merger policy of the FDIC and the recognition that it gives 
to the monopoly power aspects of bank mergers and efficiencies that can result from bank 
mergers.  The concept of deadweight loss of consumer surplus is included in this discussion to 
help promote student understanding.  Finally, our paper outlines the history of credit unions and 
their role in the U.S. financial sector, as well as their supervision and regulation by the NCUA. 
 
Events Leading Up to the FDIC’s Creation   
 Between 1921 and 1929, about 600 banks failed per year in the United States.  This was 
about ten times the failure rate of the previous decade. Yet these failures led to only modest 
alarm because they mainly consisted of small, rural banks, many of which were judged to be 
poorly run. The general consensus was that exit of these banks enhanced the strength of the 
overall banking system (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1984). 
 Concerning deposit insurance, it originated in the states decades prior to becoming a 
policy of the U.S. government. The first deposit insurance program was enacted by the state of 
New York in 1829, followed by 13 other states that established deposit insurance programs. The 
state insurance programs had several parts: (1) a deposit insurance fund that was supported by 
the assessments (premiums) of banks; (2) a board of commissioners which had the authority to 
conduct bank examinations; and (3) a defined list of investments for bank capital.  Although 
these insurance programs initially had some success in protecting depositors, they could not deal 
with the economic events of the 1920s. The economic downturn of 1921, and the substantial 
agricultural problems that lasted throughout much of the decade, resulted in numerous bank 
failures. The first state deposit insurance program to terminate operations was Washington’s in 
1921. By early 1930, all of the state programs had shut down (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, September, 1998). 
 The Great Depression, which began in 1929, shook the U.S. banking system.  It triggered 
a severe panic that led to numerous depositors attempting to convert their deposits into currency.  
However, many banks could not fulfill the deposit withdrawals and they closed. This resulted in 
the public’s confidence in the banking system deteriorating further and bank runs increased.  
Moreover, during this period, the Federal Reserve did not help banks by injecting sufficient 
liquidity into the banking system.  Critics noted that the Federal Reserve allowed the money 
supply to decrease, thus reinforcing the economic downturn (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963).  As 
seen in Table 1, 1,352 banks failed in 1930, followed by 2,294 bank failures in 1931, and 1,456 
bank failures in 1932.  The panic had its hardest impact on small banks that were located in rural 
areas of the country.  Simply put, it was the loss of depositors’ confidence in the banking system, 
and the suddenness of their withdrawal demands, that triggered a panic of extraordinary 
magnitude. In an attempt to calm nervous depositors, many states enacted bank holidays.  This 
was reinforced by President Franklin Roosevelt’s declaring a nationwide bank holiday during 
March 6-10, 1933.  In spite of these efforts, 4,004 banks failed in 1933. 
 As America’s banking system deteriorated, Congress debated the possibility of federal 
deposit insurance.  Skeptics maintained that federal deposit insurance would be a failure and they 
noted the inability of state deposit insurance programs to stabilize the banking system, to prove 
their point.  They also contended that federal deposit insurance would eliminate the penalties for 
the bad management of banks, thus allowing them to assume too much risk.  Furthermore, they 
felt that the cost of federal deposit insurance would be excessive and that federal deposit 
44 |  J O U R N A L  F O R  E C O N O M I C  E D U C A T O R S ,  1 8 ( 2 ) ,  2 0 1 8
 
44 
 
insurance would involve an excessive invasion of the federal government into the economy’s 
private sector.  President Roosevelt himself was suspicious of the federal government’s insuring 
bank deposits, saying, "We do not wish to make the United States Government liable for the 
mistakes and errors of individual banks, and put a premium on unsound banking in the future" 
(Shaw, 2015). However, the American public overwhelmingly supported the concept of deposit 
insurance. 
 On June 16, 1933, Roosevelt signed the Banking Act of 1933 into law, creating the 
FDIC. Its purpose is to promote public confidence and stability in the banking system.  The year 
1934 marked the first year of the FDIC’s operation. Initially the FDIC insured deposits up to 
$2,500 (about $45,000 today); by 1935, the deposit insurance was increased to $5,000, and so on 
as noted below.   
 
  1934 – $2,500  
  1935 – $5,000  
  1950 – $10,000  
  1966 – $15,000  
  1969 – $20,000  
  1974 – $40,000  
  1980 – $100,000  
  2008 – $250,000 
  
With trust in the banking system strengthening because of deposit insurance, bank runs 
dramatically declined.  In 1934, only 61 banks failed as seen in Table 1.   
 
Table 1. Number of Bank Failures in the United States 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Year    Number of bank failures 
 
 1930     1,352 
 1931     2,294 
 1932     1,456 
 1933     4,004   
 1934          61   
 1934-1979       558 
 1980-1989    1,015 
 1990-1999    1,507 
 2000-2009       197 
 2010-2015       356  
 2016                  5 
 2017            8 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Failures in Brief, 2017 and various Annual 
Reports 
 
Breaking Down the FDIC 
 As an independent agency of the U.S. government, the FDIC strives to foster public 
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confidence and stability in America’s banking system.  To achieve this goal, it protects 
depositors of insured banks against the loss of their deposits if their bank fails.  Also, the FDIC 
examines and supervises banks for safety, soundness, and consumer protection.  When a bank 
fails, the FDIC is ordinarily appointed receiver. This means that the FDIC assumes responsibility 
for recovering the maximum amount possible from the disposition of the failed bank’s assets and 
the pursuit of the bank’s claims.  In 2016, the FDIC insured deposits of $6.8 trillion in about 600 
million accounts at almost 6,000 banks, including commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and 
savings and loan associations (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2016). Concerning credit 
unions, the NCUA insures their accounts.  
 The FDIC provides insurance coverage for any person or entity, including  
Americans and non-Americans, conducting business with an insured bank.  FDIC insurance is 
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government.  The FDIC is proud to note 
that, since its beginning in 1934, no depositor has ever lost a penny of deposits insured by the 
FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2014). 
 The FDIC insures all types of deposits that a bank receives throughout its daily business 
activities.  These accounts include savings and checking accounts, negotiable order of 
withdrawal (NOW) accounts, time certificates of deposits (CDs), money market deposit 
accounts, and cashier’s checks and money orders issued by a bank.  However, the FDIC does not 
insure non-deposit investments such as stocks and bonds, mutual funds, annuities, and life 
insurance policies.  The basic amount of deposit insurance is $250,000 per depositor, per insured 
bank, for each account ownership category (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2014). 
 To cover its operating costs, the FDIC must generate income.  What are its sources of 
income?  Rather than receiving appropriations from the U.S. government, the FDIC charges 
assessments (premiums) that banks must pay for deposit insurance coverage.   The FDIC also 
receives interest income from its portfolio of Treasury securities.  For example, in 2016 the 
FDIC’s income totaled $10.6 billion; of this amount, assessment revenue was $10.0 billion and 
interest revenue on U.S. Treasury securities was $0.6 billion.  The balance on the FDIC’s 
Deposit Insurance Fund was $82.2 billion in 2016.  Moreover, the FDIC has a $100 billion line 
of credit with the U.S. Treasury in the event of an emergency (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 2016). 
 FDIC advocates contend that federal deposit insurance benefits the banking system.  It 
guarantees small depositors that they will have immediate access to their insured funds if their 
bank fails.  Also, it promotes public confidence in the banking system. However, skeptics argue 
that deposit insurance reduces the motivation for depositors to monitor the conduct of banks, 
thus allowing bankers to engage in risky activities.   
 
How To Increase Your FDIC Insurance Coverage Beyond $250,000 
 The FDIC’s basic insurance amount is $250,000 per individual account holder, per 
insured bank. This includes principal and accrued interest up to the $250,000 limit.  Funds 
deposited in different branches of an insured bank are not insured separately. 
 In spite of this limitation, you may be able to increase your deposit insurance coverage 
beyond $250,000.  If you have deposits in different categories of legal ownership, they are 
separately insured by the FDIC.  For example, you may have a single-ownership account and a 
joint-ownership account.  A family of two in this situation could obtain deposit insurance 
coverage of $1,000,000, as seen below. 
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Wife’s single account      $250,000  
Husband’s single account     $250,000 
Joint account of wife and husband    $500,000 
      $1,000,000 
 
 If you have accounts at more than one bank, they will be insured separately, up to a 
maximum of $250,000 at each bank.  But if the two banks undergo a merger, your accounts will 
be covered as if they had been opened at the same bank. 
 To find out more about deposit insurance coverage, you can visit the FDIC’s web page at 
www.fdic.gov.  Click the icon labeled Electronic Deposit Insurance Estimator which allows you 
to determine your insurance coverage.  You can also phone the FDIC at 877-275-3342 to 
determine your coverage. 
 
  Bank Examinations: The Camels System 
 The FDIC conducts on-site examinations of banks to ensure that they are operating in a 
safe and responsible manner, thus protecting the integrity of the Deposit Insurance Fund.   FDIC 
staff evaluate a bank’s capital, assets, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market 
risk—the acronym CAMELS represents these six components of bank examination. This system 
is also used by the Federal Reserve, Comptroller of the Currency, and National Credit Union 
Administration to examine banks and credit unions.  
 
1. Capital Adequacy.  Bank capital is the value of a bank's assets minus its liabilities. 
 Assets include cash, loans, and securities while liabilities include customer checking and 
 savings deposits and money owed to other banks and, perhaps, the Federal Reserve.   
 Examiners expect a bank to retain capital that matches the nature and extent of its risks. 
2. Asset Quality. Asset quality relates to a bank’s portfolio of loans and securities.  For 
 example, bank managers care about the default risk of their loans since they provide 
 earnings for the bank.   
3. Management:  Is the ability of a bank’s staff to ascertain, quantify, and control the risks 
 of the bank’s actions and to safeguard that the bank is financially sound in its business 
 operations. 
4. Earnings: Is the income from all operations of a bank such as interest from loans and 
 investments in securities and fees charged for a bank safe-deposit boxes.   
5. Liquidity:  Is the bank’s ability to convert assets into cash. 
6. Sensitivity to Market Risk: Indicates how changes in interest rates, commodity prices, 
 and foreign exchange rates influence a bank’s earnings and capital. 
 
 After an examination by the FDIC, a bank receives a grade in the form of a CAMELS 
rating, based on a numerical scale from 1 to 5.  The highest rating that a bank can receive is a 1; 
it represents the strongest performance and risk management practices and least likelihood of 
bank failure.   A 5 rating is the lowest grade and it represents weak risk management practices 
and highest likelihood of bank failure.  A bank’s total grade (composite rating) is based on all six 
components. 
 If the FDIC determines that a bank’s CAMELS rating is unfavorable, it can demand that 
the bank modify its behavior.  This demand is supported by the FDIC’s issuing a legally 
47 |  J O U R N A L  F O R  E C O N O M I C  E D U C A T O R S ,  1 8 ( 2 ) ,  2 0 1 8
 
47 
 
enforceable cease and desist order, or even closing a bank if its CAMELS rating is sufficiently 
low. The FDIC examines banks at least once a year.  
 To avoid repetition of effort, the FDIC works with other bank regulators.   This means 
that, state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System are examined by the 
Federal Reserve, national banks with federal charters are examined by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and insured state banks that are not members of the Federal 
Reserve System are examined by the FDIC.  Also, credit unions are examined by the NCUA. 
 
FDIC Insurance Assessments (Premiums) 
 The FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund is financed by insurance premiums, known as “bank 
assessment,” that banks pay to the FDIC.  A bank’s assessment is determined by multiplying its 
assessment base times the assessment rate (premium rate). 
 
  Bank assessment  =  assessment base  X  assessment rate  
 
The assessment base approximately equals total domestic deposits for most banks.
1
   Concerning 
the assessment rate, a bank’s CAMELS composite rating is used in determining the price of 
deposit insurance.  As seen in Table 2, banks that have favorable CAMELS composite ratings of 
1 and 2 are considered to be of relatively low risk to the Deposit Insurance Fund; they pay 
relatively low assessment rates for deposit insurance.  However, more risky banks with 
CAMELS composite ratings of 3-5 must pay higher assessment rates.  Banks pay their insurance 
assessments to the FDIC four times a year; the assessment rate and assessment base are revised 
quarterly by the FDIC. 
 Also, FDIC assessment rates vary with a bank’s size and complexity.  Large and more 
complex banks, with financial derivatives as liabilities, tend to be more risky to the Deposit 
Insurance Fund than small banks with no financial derivatives.  Therefore, in 2016 large banks 
had to pay an additional surcharge for deposit insurance which equaled 4.5 cents per $100 of 
assessment base.   These “large” banks are generally defined as those with total assets of $10 
billion or more. Table 2 shows the FDIC’s assessment rates for 2016.  
 
Who Bears the Burden of Increasing Deposit Insurance Premiums? 
 In March, 2010 the New Mexico Business Weekly published an article, “Rising FDIC 
Premiums Bleed Lenders” (Domrzalski, 2010). The article discusses that in 2008, First 
Community Bank of New Mexico paid premiums of $2.3 million for FDIC deposit insurance.  
As the financial crisis of 2008-2009 worsened, many banks failed, thus draining the FDIC’s 
Deposit Insurance Fund.  To replenish revenues, the FDIC increased its deposit insurance 
rates for banks.  Thus, in 2009, First Community’s insurance premiums were increased to almost 
$9 million, a fourfold jump compared to 2008.  Moreover, Century Bank in Santa Fe, New 
Mexico realized a sizable increase in its deposit insurance premiums.  In 2007, the bank paid no 
premiums to the FDIC because the Deposit Insurance Fund was ample. However, Century paid 
 
-------------------- 
1
 Prior to 2010, a bank’s assessment base was approximately equal to its total domestic deposits.  However, 
in 2010 the Dodd-Frank Act modified the definition of the assessment base.   A bank’s assessment base now equals 
its average consolidated total assets minus its average tangible equity.  Therefore, for most banks the assessment 
base is approximately equal to total domestic deposits. Yet for large banks, that have financial derivatives as 
liabilities, the assessment base becomes larger. 
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Table 2.  FDIC Assessment Rates for Established Small Banks, Insured Five or More Years 
(Under $10 billion in assets)* 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Composite 
  CAMELS       FDIC Assessment Rate Range: 
  Rating     (Cents per $100 of Insured Deposits)  
     
   
  1 or 2                                                                 1.5-16                                 
  3                                                                  3-30    
  4 or 5                                                      11-30 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Banks that are not “established” (insured less than five years) pay higher assessment rates 
ranging from 7 to 40 cents per $100 of insured deposits. 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC Assessment Rates, July 1, 2016. 
 
$200,000 in 2008 for deposit insurance, $700,000 in 2009, and $2 million in 2010.  The increase 
in insurance premiums had the effect of raising the banks’ costs of doing business and decreasing 
their profitability.  To avoid this outcome, banks sought ways to pass the rising insurance 
assessments on to their patrons. 
 To pass higher insurance premiums onto its patrons, a bank might impose fees on 
depositors’ checking or savings accounts, lower interest rates paid to depositors on their savings 
accounts, or increase interest rates on loans to households and businesses.  Under what 
conditions will a bank be able to pass rising deposit insurance premiums on to its depositors in 
the form of lower interest rates?   The concept of interest elasticity of supply helps provide an 
answer to this question.  Consider the two extreme cases of perfectly inelastic supply and 
perfectly elastic supply, as discussed below. 
 Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Deposits: Households Bear All of the Increase in  
Deposit Insurance Premiums.  Figure 1 illustrates the market for savings deposits.  
Assume that a household’s only saving option is to maintain deposits at a particular bank.  
Therefore, the household’s supply curve of savings deposits is perfectly inelastic 
(vertical), as seen in Figure 1a. This means that the household will supply $100 of 
savings deposits no matter what the interest rate is on these deposits.  Now suppose that 
the FDIC raises its premium on deposit insurance.  This results in an increase in the 
bank’s cost of doing business, a decrease in its profitability, and a decrease in its demand 
curve for savings deposits—the bank’s demand curve for savings deposits decreases from 
D0 to D1.  Therefore, the equilibrium interest rate on savings deposits decreases from 5 
percent to, say, 3 percent; but the household still supplies $100 of savings deposits to the 
bank.  The household’s lack of saving alternatives means that the bank will be able to 
pass all of the increase in deposit insurance premiums to the household in the form of a 
lower interest rate on savings deposits. 
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 Perfectly Elastic Supply of Deposits: Banks Bear All of the Increase in Deposit 
Insurance Premiums.  Assume that a household has many (an infinite number of) 
alternatives for saving money such as Treasury securities, corporate stocks or bonds, 
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mutual funds, savings deposits at banks, and the like.  Referring to Figure 1b, the 
household’s supply curve of savings deposits becomes perfectly elastic (horizontal) at  
the interest rate of 5 percent; that is, the household will not supply deposits at any interest 
rate less than 5 percent.  When the FDIC raises its premium on deposit insurance, the 
bank’s demand curve for savings deposits decreases from D0 to D1.  However, the  
interest rate that the bank must pay households remains unchanged at 5 percent.  Thus, 
the bank bears all of the premium increase in the form lower net revenues. 
 From these two cases, we can make the following generalizations.  Given the bank’s 
demand curve for savings deposits, the more inelastic the household’s supply curve of deposits, 
the greater the extent that the household will bear the increase in deposit-insurance premiums in 
the form of a lower interest rate on savings deposits (or a higher service fee on savings deposits).  
Conversely, the bank will absorb more of the increase in insurance premiums out of decreasing 
net revenue as the household’s supply curve of deposits becomes more elastic.2 
 
Resolving Bank Failures: Deposit Payoffs Versus Purchase-And-Assumption Transactions  
 Although the FDIC strives to promote sound financial practices for insured banks, 
failures sometimes occur.  The resolution process begins when a bank is proclaimed a failed 
bank by its chartering agency—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has the exclusive 
authority to issue a federal charter for a national bank while any state may issue a charter for a 
state-chartered bank.  This results in the FDIC’s becoming the receiver of the failed bank, which 
means that it has the authority to dispose of the bank’s assets and pay off the depositors. (Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2017)  Table 3 provides two examples of these approaches. 
 As a receiver of a failed bank, the FDIC can pay off patrons directly for their deposit 
accounts, up to the insured limit of $250,000 per depositor for each account-ownership category, 
as soon as the records of the deposit accounts are determined.  This is known as the deposit 
payoff approach.  Depositors having accounts greater than the insurance cap become creditors of 
the failed bank for the amount that their deposits are greater than the insurance limit.  The FDIC 
mails a check to each depositor on the uninsured portion of their deposits when the FDIC 
liquidates the assets of the failed bank, such as the bank building, office equipment, and so on.  
Whether depositors receive full payment on their uninsured deposits depends on the value of 
these assets when they are liquidated.  The payments that the FDIC makes to depositors is a drain 
on its Deposit Insurance Fund. 
 An advantage of the deposit payoff approach is that it tends to promote market discipline 
on banks through the influence of uninsured depositors.  These depositors realize that, in the 
event of bank failure, they may not receive the full value of their deposits.  Thus, they have the 
incentive to monitor the activities and performance of their bank.  However, there are 
disadvantages to the deposit payoff approach.  Banking services are temporarily suspended, even 
for fully insured depositors who must wait several days to receive checks from the FDIC. For 
 
 
------------------------- 
2
  It is also important to note the effects of the elasticity of a bank’s demand for deposits on the  
incidence of insurance premiums in cases where the elasticity of supply of deposits is anywhere  
between the two above described examples—that is, where its numerical range is between zero  
and infinity. In such cases, the less elastic the demand for deposits and the more elastic the supply of deposits, the 
larger is the share of insurance premiums received from the bank’s revenues rather than from its share paid by the 
bank’s customers.  
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Table 3.  FDIC Resolution of Bank Failures: Example of Purchase and Assumption Approach 
and Deposit Payoff Approach  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Conway Bank Assumes the Deposits of The Farmers and Merchants State Bank of Argonia 
On October 13, 2017, The Farmers and Merchants State Bank of Argonia, (Argonia, Kansas) 
was closed by the Office of the State Bank Commissioner of Kansas, which appointed the FDIC 
as receiver. To protect the depositors, the FDIC entered into a purchase and assumption 
agreement with Conway Bank (Conway Springs, Kansas) to assume all of the deposits of The 
Farmers and Merchants State Bank of Argonia, thus becoming the merger partner. 
 The two branches of The Farmers and Merchants State Bank of Argonia reopened as 
branches of Conway Bank during their normal business hours. Depositors of The Farmers and 
Merchants State Bank of Argonia  automatically became depositors of Conway Bank. Deposits 
continued to be insured by the FDIC, so there was no need for customers to change their banking 
relationship in order to retain their deposit insurance coverage up to applicable limits.   
 As of June 30, 2017, The Farmers and Merchants State Bank of Argonia had 
approximately $34.2 million in total assets and $29.6 million in total deposits. Conway Bank will 
pay the FDIC a premium of 2.5 percent to assume all of the deposits of The Farmers and 
Merchants State Bank of Argonia. Besides assuming all of the deposits of the failed bank, 
Conway Bank agreed to purchase essentially all of the assets. 
 
FDIC Approves the Payout of the Insured Deposits of The Community's Bank   
On September 13, 2013, the FDIC approved the payout of the insured deposits of The 
Community's Bank (Bridgeport, Connecticut).  The bank was closed by the Connecticut 
Department of Banking, which appointed the FDIC as receiver. 
 The FDIC was unable to find another bank to take over the operations of The 
Community's Bank. The FDIC will mail checks directly to depositors of The Community's Bank 
for the amount of their insured money. As a convenience to depositors, the FDIC has made 
arrangements with People's United Bank (Bridgeport, CT) to accept the failed bank's direct 
deposits from the federal government, such as Social Security and Veterans' payments for 90 
days.  
 As of June 30, 2013, The Community's Bank had about $26.3 million in total assets and 
$25.7 million in total deposits. The FDIC estimated that the resolution cost to the Deposit 
Insurance Fund was $7.8 million. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Failures in Brief, 2017, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
 uninsured depositors, even if they receive full payment, they may have to wait a considerable 
period of time for the FDIC to liquidate the bank’s assets.  Moreover, when a failed bank closes 
its doors, such action is generally widely reported in newspapers and on television.  This can 
cause fear among the banking public concerning the soundness of the banking system (Gilbert, 
1985). 
 The other option for resolving bank failure is the purchase and assumption approach 
under which a healthy bank mergers with a failing bank.  This means that the healthy bank 
purchases (assumes) all of the deposits liabilities of the failed bank.  The depositors of the failed 
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bank become depositors of the healthy bank and they have immediate rights to their money.  
Thus, all depositors, even those having accounts in excess of the insurance limit, are fully 
protected.  Moreover, the healthy bank may purchase some or all of the failing bank’s assets, 
such as loans and securities, that it deems to be of good value.  The FDIC provides additional 
cash to the healthy bank if the value of the assets of the failed bank offered for purchase is less 
than the deposit liabilities to be assumed.  This cash payment is a drain on the FDIC’s Deposit 
Insurance Fund. 
     To implement a purchase and assumption transaction, the FDIC first identifies a group 
of healthy banks as possible merger partners of the failing bank.  It takes into account overall 
financial condition, competitive environment, geographic location, minority owned status, and 
the like.   In strict confidence, the FDIC invites healthy banks to submit bids to purchase all of 
the failed bank’s deposit liabilities and those assets that the bidding bank considers to be of high 
quality.  The FDIC’s Board of Directors is responsible for determining the winning bid. 
 In a purchase and assumption transaction, an account owner’s deposit contract is with the 
failed bank, and it is canceled upon the bank’s failure.  The healthy bank is not responsible for 
maintaining either the failed bank’s interest rates or the terms of the deposit contract.  However, 
depositors of a failed bank can establish a new account with the acquiring bank or withdraw their 
funds without penalty (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2014).   
 An advantage of the purchase and assumption approach is that the failing bank is not shut 
down.  On the next business day following the takeover, the failing bank is open for business as 
usual, except that  it now has a new name on its front door—the name of its acquiring merger 
partner.  The banking public tends to be accepting of this process and thus the public’s 
confidence in the banking system is maintained. 
 So which approach should the FDIC use in resolving bank failures—the deposit payoff 
approach or the purchase and assumption approach?  In selecting its resolution method, the FDIC 
currently uses the least-cost principle which means that it uses the approach that has the lowest 
cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund, irrespective of other factors. In practice, the purchase and 
assumption approach is currently used in the high majority of bank failure resolutions.  For 
example, during 2007-2017, 516 banks failed in the United States.  The FDIC resolved these 
failures by using the purchase and assumption approach in 97 percent of the failures and the 
deposit payoff approach in 3 percent of the failures (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
2017). Generally, the FDIC will receive at least one bid that is less costly than the estimated cost 
of liquidation via the deposit payoff approach.  However, if the FDIC is unable to find another 
bank to take over a failing bank, it will resort to the deposit payoff approach.
3 
 
During the Great Recession of 2007-2009, many people worried about the safety of their 
bank deposits. To reassure depositors about its resolution of bank failures, the FDIC provided 
them a rare look at how it takes over a failed bank and selects a merger partner for the bank.   In 
March, 2009 the FDIC allowed the staff of CBS News to film the takeover of Heritage 
 
 
------------------------- 
3
 In the past, the FDIC sometimes (rarely) used open-bank-assistance to prevent bank failures.  This resulted 
in the FDIC granting a failing bank direct loans, cash contributions, asset purchases, or the assumption of liabilities 
including deposits.  Generally, open bank assistance was used when the FDIC determined that the failing bank was 
so large that its closure could threaten the stability of the nation’s entire financial system (“too big to fail”).  This 
option was terminated by the FDIC in 1991, although it was temporarily used during the financial crisis of 2008 in 
order to keep Citigroup and Bank of America afloat.  The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 totally eliminated this option 
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2017).   
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Community Bank of Illinois, which had bad real estate loans.  The takeover occurred in secrecy 
on a Friday night, after the bank closed for the day, to make sure that there were no depositors at 
the bank who might panic.  Seizing the bank on a Friday also gave the FDIC the weekend to go 
through the bank’s books so the bank could reopen smoothly the following Monday with a new 
merger partner.  This fascinating takeover was broadcast on CBS 60 Minutes--Your Bank Has 
Failed: What Happens Next?  It can be seen by going to  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90m1oUyeir4.   
 
Does FDIC Insurance Encourage Bankers’ Risk Taking and Misuse of Funds?  
 Since its beginnings, the FDIC has helped prevent runs on banks.  However, does deposit 
insurance encourage risk taking and the misuse of funds by bankers? 
 Without deposit insurance, depositors tend to be concerned that their bank might fail, 
thus providing them an incentive to monitor the bank’s actions.  For example, prior to making a 
deposit, households and businesses could analyze a bank’s balance sheet and income statement 
to make sure that the bank is safe and sound.  After making deposits, they would continue to 
keep track of the bank’s activities and they might withdraw funds if red flags appear.  Therefore, 
the threat of deposit withdrawals by savvy depositors can discourage a bank from taking 
excessive risks or misusing funds. 
 However, deposit insurance reduces the incentives of depositors to police banks.  Small 
depositors, having deposits less than $250,000, know that they will be fully reimbursed if their 
bank fails; so they are not unduly concerned if bankers take excessive risks.  Moreover, such 
depositors do not generally analyze balance sheets or income statements for danger signs.  This 
lack of attention provides bankers additional leeway to misuse deposits since they are not 
concerned that their excessive risk taking will be disciplined by withdrawals of deposits.  
However, large depositors, with deposits greater than the insured limit of $250,000, have greater 
concern about the behavior of bankers since they may not be fully compensated if the bank fails.  
Simply put, with deposit insurance, bankers tend to assume more risk than they would normally, 
because they realize the benefits of risky behavior while the FDIC assumes the costs.  Thus, in 
protecting depositors, the FDIC creates what economists call moral hazard.  Most economic and 
financial historians believe that FDIC insurance has contributed to the rise in risk taking among 
bankers. 
 The failure of the First National Bank of Keystone (FNBK) in 1999 provides an example 
of excessive risk taking and misuse of bank funds (Pasley, 2016).  In 1904 FNBK originated as a 
small community bank in the coal-mining town of Keystone, West Virginia.  It served the local 
economy well by making loans to businesses and households and accepting their deposits.  By 
the 1970s, the bank’s business had grown beyond Keystone, and it made loans throughout West 
Virginia and Pennsylvania. In the early 1990s, the FNBK was characterized as one of the 
country’s top performing banks. However, during the mid-1990s, the bank began purchasing 
risky loans from other banks throughout the nation.  To attract deposits to fund its loan portfolio, 
FNBK bank provided interest rates on time certificates of deposits (CDs) that were 2 percentage 
points higher than the banking-industry average.  This behavior put FNBK in a risky position 
which resulted in defaults occurring on many of the loans that the bank purchased.  Moreover, 
the top managers of the bank embezzled tens of millions of dollars.  For years, they deceived 
banking regulators and their depositors by forging documents and board minutes.  However, in 
1999, the regulators determined that FNBK was insolvent.  The bank was closed on September 1, 
1999 and the FDIC was named the receiver.  On September 3, 1999 the FDIC reached an 
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agreement with Ameribank, a healthy bank, to merge with FNBK (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 1999). Federal prosecutors filed criminal charges against the managers of FNBK, 
several of which were convicted and imprisoned.  
 
Bank Merger Welfare Effects 
 The merger of Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) and JPMorgan Chase provides an 
example of the possible welfare effects of bank mergers.  Founded in 1889, WaMu originally 
served as a conservative savings bank, providing financial services to local households and 
businesses.  By the early 2000s, WaMu aggressively offered mortgages and credit cards to 
customers that other banks deemed too risky.  During 2007-2008, WaMu suffered sizable losses 
on its mortgage loans and credit card loans, and its credit rating fell.  As customers’ confidence 
in WaMu deteriorated, they withdrew almost 9 percent of the bank’s deposits, $17 billion, over 
the course of ten days.  This resulted in the bank’s failure in 2008.  The FDIC became the 
receiver and it arranged a merger between WaMu and JPMorgan Chase, thus protecting all of 
WaMu’s depositors.  The failure of WaMu resulted in JPMorgan Chase, the nation’s third largest 
bank, merging with WaMu, the nation’s fifth largest bank.  This resulted in JPMorgan Chase’s 
becoming the nation’s second largest bank, with $2 trillion of assets (Grind, 2012).  The merger 
of these financial giants had implications for antitrust policy in that it could result in additional 
monopoly power as well as greater operating efficiencies.   
 Mergers among competing banks can yield welfare gains and losses for the economy. 
Welfare gains stem from increasing operating efficiencies (economies of scale and economies of 
scope).  Welfare losses arise if the merger results in monopoly power for the newly established 
bank–the ability to restrict output and charge a higher price for its services. Whether the 
economy’s welfare increases or decreases depends on the magnitudes of these two opposing 
forces, as outlined in the following section (Williamson, 1968).  
  Figure 2 illustrates the market for loans offered by Bank A and Bank B, the only banks  
making loans in the state of Washington.  Being equally efficient banks, suppose that they each 
operate under  constant cost conditions in which MC0 = AC0 = $600.  Also, being  competitive 
banks, suppose that they operate at their break-even points in the long run; therefore, each bank 
charges a price of $600 per loan and produces an output of 60 loans.  Consumer surplus equals 
area A+B+C, which totals $18,000.
4 
 
  From this starting point, we compare two cases.  First, a merger of Bank A and Bank B 
occurs which results in the newly established bank, Bank C, becoming a monopoly; but there is 
no improvement in operating efficiencies.  Second, a merger of Bank A and Bank B occurs 
which results in Bank C becoming a monopoly that realizes improvements in operating 
efficiencies. 
 
Case 1: Monopoly with no Efficiency Gains.  Referring to Figure 2, by operating as a 
monopoly, Bank C will maximize total profit by providing 30 loans, where marginal revenue 
(MR) equals marginal cost (MC0), and charging a price of $900 per loan; the bank realizes a 
profit totaling $9,000, denoted by area B.   However, because Bank C is a monopoly, it  
 
------------------------- 
4
  Consumer surplus is the difference between the maximum price that a buyer is willing and able to pay for a 
particular quantity and the lower market equilibrium price.  Geometrically, consumer surplus is the triangular area 
under a product’s demand curve down to the equilibrium price.  The dollar value of this triangle equals (base X 
height) / 2.   
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 maximizes profit by restricting output below the competitive level (60 loans) and charging a 
higher price.  This results in a deadweight loss of consumer surplus
 
of $4,500, denoted by area A.  
This sum represents the cost that society bears as a result of the monopoly power of Bank C.   
 
 
  Case 2: Monopoly with Efficiency Gains.  As a result of the merger, suppose that Bank C 
realizes operating efficiencies that neither Bank A nor Bank B could realize by themselves.  
Referring to Figure 3, suppose that these efficiencies cause Bank C’s cost curve to decrease to 
MC1 = AC1.  As a monopoly, Bank C will maximize profit by providing 40 loans, where MC1 = 
MR, and charging a price of $800 per loan.  This results in a deadweight loss of consumer 
surplus of $2,000, denoted by area D.  However, against this efficiency loss is the reduction in 
operating cost from $600 to $400 per loan. Therefore, Bank C can operate at its profit-
maximizing output of 40 loans, at a reduction in cost totaling $8,000, denoted by area E. 
Comparing these opposing forces, we conclude that the merger is desirable because area E 
($8,000) exceeds area D ($2,000).  In in other words, there is a net efficiency gain of $6,000 as a 
result of the merger (DeYoung, 1991). 
 
  It has been assumed that Bank C realizes cost reductions that are caused by the merger, 
and they were unavailable to Bank A or Bank B.  If the cost reductions stem from productivity 
improvements, such as technological advances or new work rules leading to increased output per 
worker, a welfare gain occurs for the economy because fewer resources are needed to produce a 
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 given level of output.  These resources can be shifted to the production of other goods.  
However, cost reductions due to the formation of Bank C can be monetary in nature.  Being a 
newly-formed bank, suppose that Bank C can extract wage concessions from its workers that 
could not be attained by Bank A or Bank B. Such a cost reduction represents a transfer of 
dollars from workers to Bank C and does not provide a welfare gain for the overall economy. In 
this case, the merger of Bank A and Bank B reduces the economy’s welfare by the amount of 
the deadweight loss of consumer surplus (area D) with no welfare-increasing efficiency effect 
(area E).  Therefore, the economy’s welfare falls by the amount of the deadweight loss of 
consumer surplus.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 According to the Bank Merger Act of 1960, mergers of federally insured banks cannot 
occur without the prior approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, 
or the FDIC, depending on whether the newly created bank is a national bank, a state member 
bank of the Federal Reserve System, or a state bank that is not a member of the Federal Reserve 
System, respectively.  Concerning these regulators, the Bank Merger Act forbids them from 
approving a proposed merger that would lead to a monopoly in any part of the United States.  
However, an exception can be made if the regulator determines that the anticompetitive effect of 
the proposed merger is dwarfed by a merger that fulfills the convenience and needs of the 
community to be served.
5
 For example, the FDIC may approve a merger transaction in order to 
prevent the harm done to society if one of the banks fails.  Also, the FDIC can take into account 
the degree to which the proposed merger would likely create a stronger, more efficient bank that 
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is able to compete more vigorously in the relevant geographic market (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 2014). imply put, regulators consider both the monopoly power effect and 
efficiency effect of a bank  merger
6
 (U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, 1997). However, it is difficult to determine how much weight regulators give to 
these effects when they evaluate mergers.
7 
 
National Credit Union Administration and Deposit Insurance 
 A complete analysis of the safety of our banking industry necessitates a brief outline of 
the history, role and regulation of credit unions in the United States. Although the total assets of 
the credit unions are relatively small in comparison to the combined assets of the U.S. 
commercial banks, there are over 5,000 credit unions currently operating in the country.  Credit 
unions play an important role in financial intermediation, especially with respect to providing 
funds to small borrowers and serving particular communities where they conduct their business. 
Yet, in spite of their obvious contributions to the proper functioning and the wellbeing of our 
financial system, analyses and descriptions of these financial intermediaries in leading Money 
and Banking textbooks are typically more scant than those of commercial banks. Our paper 
attempts to remedy this omission.  
 The St. Mary’s Cooperative Credit Association was America’s first credit union.  It 
began operating on April 6
th
, 1909 in Manchester, New Hampshire. On April 15
th
 of the same 
year, the Massachusetts Credit Union Act was passed, thereby establishing a basic legal structure 
of credit unions in the United States. This legal document provided key elements for subsequent 
credit unions laws, including the 1934 Federal Credit Union Act. This act created the Federal 
Credit Union Division and placed it under the Farm Credit Administration’s control. The number 
of credit unions grew from its humble beginnings in 1909 to 3,756 by the end of 1940. This 
growth continued in both the number of credit unions and their assets. By the end of 1960, there 
were 9,905 credit unions with $2.7 billion in assets and some 6.1 million members. By the end of 
1970, the number of credit unions increased to 12,977 and their assets rose to $8.8 billion. The 
first decade of 2000 saw a decline in the number of credit unions combined with an increase of 
their asset holdings, resulting in 7,339 credit unions with $914 billion in total assets in 2010. In 
2010 the membership of credit unions reached nearly 90.5 million. The upward growth trend in 
the credit unions membership and their combined assets continued thereafter. As of June 2017, 
the membership of the federally insured credit unions increased to 109.3 million and their total
 
 
-------------------------
 
5
  The bank regulators’ recognition of possible efficiencies in bank mergers is consistent with the 1997 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade 
Commission which state that mergers may foster efficiencies (e.g., economies of scale, technological innovation), 
and these efficiencies may take place in markets where they are likely to be passed on to consumers to the degree 
that the efficiencies outweigh any probable anticompetitive effect. (U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission, 1997)  
6
  Based on the authors’ phone conversations with economists at the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System and the FDIC, we became aware of an efficient way of learning about the possible monopoly power 
effect and efficiency effect of a bank merger.  For example, go to the home page of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.  Use the search box to find Federal Reserve orders that approve the merger of various 
banks.  Reading these orders, you can find details about the factors that the Federal Reserve considered when 
making a merger decision. 
7
  A more detailed outline of the history of U.S. credit unions and their oversight by the NCUA is available at 
the NCUA’s website at www.ncua.gov. 
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assets reached $1.35 trillion.
8 
 U.S. credit unions were granted full legal status under the 1934 Federal Credit Union Act. 
This congressional legislation authorized, among other legal issues, the formation of federally 
chartered credit unions in all 50 states. It also determined the amount of coverage and the terms 
of all federally insured accounts. In 1970, Congress created the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA), an independent agency that supervises and charters federal credit 
unions. Its structure and procedures resemble closely those of the FDIC, with a few minor 
differences. The same year the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund was established. 
This agency provided, for the first time in the credit unions’ history, share deposit insurance up 
to $20,000 per deposit for all federally chartered credit unions. In 1974 insurance coverage was 
increased to $40,000 per share deposit. This insurance coverage was increased further to 
$100,000 per deposit in 1979. 
 An important milestone in the credit union deposit insurance coverage expansion was 
reached in 1987, when the NCUA notified state-chartered credit unions that they could qualify 
for federal share insurance. This led to 432 state-chartered credit unions converting to the federal 
insurance program by 1991. Noteworthy is also the fact that the NCUA adopted the CAMELS 
rating system for evaluating credit unions. The most recent increase in the credit union share 
deposit insurance occurred in 2010, within the clauses of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, whereby the maximum amount of share insurance rose to 
$250,000 per deposit. At the end of June 2017, the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund, 
that provides this share deposit coverage, had $13.2 billion in assets.  This insurance fund is 
financed by the premiums of credit unions and interest income on the NCUA’s holdings of 
government securities.  It has the backing of the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.  
Similar to the FDIC, the NCUA resolves failures of credit unions through its deposit payoff 
approach and its purchase and assumption approach (National Credit Union Administration, 
2016). 
Conclusion 
 Financial institutions play a key role in our country’s economic growth by facilitating 
flows of financial capital between savers and borrowers. The beginnings of economic recessions 
can often be traced to financial crises that originated in the banking sector. Therefore, the safety 
and the proper functioning of the banking sector is of paramount importance. Illiquidity caused 
by runs on banks was one of the main reasons for numerous bank failures throughout the U.S. 
banking industry’s history. The FDIC has played a crucial role in preventing runs on banks by 
providing deposit insurance since its establishment in 1934. Yet, in spite of its obvious 
importance in our economy, its structure, functions and the role it fulfills in providing safety for 
banks and confidence in our banking system are typically not sufficiently analyzed in most 
leading Money and Banking textbooks. Similarly, most Money and Banking textbooks also do 
not include analyses of the NCUA, the insurer of share drafts and the regulatory agency of U.S. 
credit unions. Our article remedies these omissions. 
 The focus of our paper is on describing and analyzing the methods that the FDIC uses to 
prevent bank failures and to assess bank mergers. We also provide a detailed discussion of the 
insurance coverage that is provided by the FDIC and the NCUA. One of the key contributions of 
 
------------------------- 
8. The most current information about the status of U.S. credit unions is available in Industry at Glance (2017) 
published by the NCUA.   
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our article with respect to the FDIC’s methods of the prevention of bank failure, is our analysis 
of the welfare costs and benefits of bank mergers for the U.S. economy. Mergers tend to result in 
movement toward monopoly. We describe two possible welfare effects of such a monopoly. First 
our paper focuses on a monopoly with no efficiency gain, and thereafter the case of a monopoly 
with an efficiency gain is analyzed. These methods are used, to some extent, by regulators in 
their decisions concerning the approval or the denial of bank mergers. We also use micro 
economic concepts of the elasticity of supply and demand for insurance premiums to determine 
whether their incidence falls on banks or depositors. It is our hope that these contributions will 
provide useful information for economic classes in Principles of Economics and Money and 
Banking courses.         
 
References 
DeYoung, Robert. 1991. “The Efficiencies Defense and Commercial Bank Merger Regulation,” 
Review of Industrial Organization, 6 (3): 269-282. 
Domrzalski, Dennis. 2010. “Rising FDIC Premiums Bleed Lenders,” New Mexico Business 
Weekly. March 15. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 2017. Bank Failures in Brief. Washington, D.C. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 2017. Resolutions Handbook. Washington D.C. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 2017. Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008-
2013, Washington D.C. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 2016. Annual Report. Washington, D.C. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 2014, April. Bank Merger Transactions-FDIC. 
Washington, D.C. at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-1200.html 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 2014. Your Insured Deposits. Washington, D.C. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 1999. FDIC Approves Assumption of Insured Local 
Deposits of First National Bank of Keystone. September 3. Washington, D.C. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 1998. A Brief History of Deposit Insurance in the United 
States. September. Washington, D.C. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 1998. Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC 
Experience, 1980-1994. Washington, D.C. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 1984. The First Fifty Years: A History of the FDIC, 
Washington D.C. 
Friedman, Milton and Anna Schwartz. 1963. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-
1960. National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton, NJ. 
Gilbert, Alton. 1985. “Recent Changes in Handling Bank Failures and Their Effects on the 
Banking Industry,” Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, July-August: 21-28. 
Grind, Kirsten. 2012. The Lost Bank: The Story of Washington Mutual—The Biggest Bank 
Failure in American History. New York, Simon and Schuster. 
National Credit Union Administration. 2017. Industry at A Glance. Washington, D.C. 
National Credit Union Administration. 2016. Annual Report. Washington, D.C. 
Pasley, Robert. 2016. Anatomy of a Banking Scandal: The Keystone Bank Failure—Harbinger of 
the 2008 Financial Crisis. New Brunswick, NJ. Transaction Publishers. 
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. 1997. Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines: Issued on April 2, 1992, Revised on April 8, 1997. Washington, D.C. 
Williamson, Oliver. 1968. “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,” 
American Economic Review. December. 
